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J.M. I<EYNES ON HISTORY AND
CONVENTION
John B. Davis

In 1938, two years after the publication of The General Theory, Keynes read a
paper to the Memoir Club gathered at Tilton entitled 'My Early Beliefs', in
which he criticized many of his early philosophical attachments. He confessed that when it came down to disagreements between his friends over
knowing which states of mind might be thought intrinsically good, it was
not 'a matter of direct inspection, of direct unanalysable intuition about
which it was useless and impossible to argue', but '[i]n practice' a matter of
'who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility' - G.E. Moore being
the acknowledged master of the art (C W. X: 437-8). t Keynes's 1938
critique, however, was not only aimed at the early concept of intuition he
had inherited from Moore's Principia Ethica. In his early attachment to
intuition as certain, unfailing direct insight into the nature of what was real,
Keynes had also gone on to deny that general rules and conventions played
any significant role in judgement: 'we repudiated entirely customary morals,
conventions and traditional wisdom' (C W. X: 446). This was hardly in
keeping with the answer he had recently given in The General Theory, in his
famous twelfth chapter on long-term expectation, to the question, 'How
then are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing
investments carried out in practice?': 'In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a
rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention' (C TP. VII: 152, 152).
Here I shall not attempt to account for how Keynes came to abandon his
early philosophical thinking about intuition and judgement, a task I have
pursued at length elsewhere (Davis 1994a). Rather, I shall set out Keynes's
new philosophical thinking about convention as it appears in The General
Theory, and then attempt to chart the likely post-General Theory path of
development of the concept of convention in Keynes's thinking. This is
arguably a task of considerable importance in the interpretation of Keynes's
later economics, since the genuinely revolutionary positions found in The
General Theory appear to depend in important respects upon the new views
Keynes developed there regarding history and conventions.
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The concept of convention is the primary philosophical concept of
Keynes's later philosophical thinking. Yet because it emerged in Keynes's
overall thinking tnore as a product of decisions made regarding nonphilosophical matters, in connection "With the probletns of argument
encountered in the "Writing of The General Theory in the 1930s, the concept
of convention never received the systematic investigation from Keynes that
his early philosophical notions had "When philosophy and ethics "Were his
chief preoccupation. As a result, because the concept has ahvays been seen
as an economic concept - and then "With an uncertain pedigree - it has gone
unappreciated as a specifically philosophical contribution of The General
Theory. The lack of attention the concept of convention received from
Keynes may also be due to his being influenced by Lud"Wig Wittgenstein's
thinking about convention. Keynes may have felt that Call1bridge "Was
already producing a clear philosophical understanding of the nature of
the concept, and that Wittgenstein was better suited to take on prilllary
responsibility in that effort. I explore the connections between Keynes and
Wittgenstein in regard to the concept of convention briefly at the end of
the discussion below (pp. 218-21). In any event, whatever the relationship
between Keynes and Wittgenstein, Keynes's failure to take rules and conventions seriously in his early philosophy left hilll "Without a clear account
of the nature and "Workings of convention "When he turned to the topic in
The General Theory and "Was chiefly concerned "With econolllic argulllent. In a
second edition of the book he might have chosen to alllplify those passages
"Where the operation of conventions "Was central to his argulllent. But what
"Was ultilllately tnost needed was a careful elaboration of the central ideas he
believed were involved in the concept. On account of his early death and
the tremendous detnands upon his tillle of policy and economic debate in
his last years, this elaboration never occurred. Accordingly, it is necessary to
reconstruct how Keynes's argument and thinking about convention lllight
have proceeded in light of the foundations laid down for the concept in The

General Theory.
I undertake this project in a nUlllber of steps. First, turning to the
passages of The General Theory where convention is central, I lllap out the
structure of the concept there, lllaking very brief reference to the changes
in Keynes's philosophical thinking that were afoot subsequent to his
earlier exchange in the 1920s "With Frank Ralllsey on the llleaning of
probability. Second, I discuss ho"W Keynes's treatlllent of the concept of
convention was opaque yet also susceptible of SOllle clarification. The topic
here lends itself to the idea of a second edition of The General Theory. In such
a work it "Would surely have been Keynes's intention to preserve the
essential integrity of the original "Work so as to maintain the power of its
conclusions. Though the concept of convention is very central to Keynes's
later econolllic thinking, most readers "Would no doubt have seen further
discussion of the concept as a distracting digression. As has long been
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appreciated, the basic ideas of the book "Were too revolutionary to be easily
absorbed, and thus it "Would not pay to complicate an argument "Which many
already found difficult. 2 Third, I proceed to further possible developments
in the concept of convention that Keynes might have undertaken in a more
peaceful later life. "My Early Beliefs' signals Keynes's intention to set the
record straight about his early philosophical thinking, but it goes little
beyond this. Moreover, Keynes's post-General Theory "Writings do not add
significantly to our understanding of Keynes's thinking on the subject.
Thus, ITly strategy in this section of the chapter is to examine the shortcomings of Keynes's General Theory vie"W of convention together "With
indications of the likely direction of his thinking to construct a case for
the development of his later thinking on the subject. Finally, in the last
section of the chapter, the influence of Wittgenstein and the confluence of
Keynes's and Wittgenstein's thinking on convention are investigated In an
effort to isolate key philosophical issues involved in the concept.

THE STRUCTURE OF KEYNES'S GENERAL THEORY
CONCEPT OF CONVENTION
To understand the role the concept of convention plays in Keynes's thinking"We need to understand ho"W Keynes believed that less than full employITlent equilibria "Were possible in the economy. This in turn is perhaps best
understood in the context of the principal misinterpretation of Keynes's
thinking in the years afler the publication of T"he General Theory. Economists
trained in 'What Keynes had called classical thinking, yet 'Who label themselves Keynesians (or neoclassical Keynesians), generally agree that equilibrium unemployment is only possible "When there are frictions or
imperfections in the economy. This mistaken interpretation of Keynes's
vie"Ws centres most often upon the labour market (but also the bond
market) "Where it is typically said that "Workers may suffer money illusion,
or an inability to distinguish real and money-"Wages. Ho'Wever, in the 1980s
this vie"W 'Was found unpersuasive by many economists 'When rationalexpectations theorists argued that rational agents 'Would not make systematic expectational errors. Without systematic errors in expectation, it "Was
then argued, equilibrium unemployment simply could not occur, and
Keynes's equilibrium unemployment vie'W (or "What it had been taken to
be by neoclassical Keynesians) 'Was said to be based upon a misunderstanding of the process of expectation formation.
Overlooked in this history of reception "Was the fact that Keynes himself
had never employed the idea of money illusion or indeed argued that
econoITlic agents, rational or otherv.rise, made systematic expectational
errors. 3 Indeed, in Keynes's vie'W, if "Workers 'Were 'Willing to reduce their
ITloney-"Wage demands in pursuit of employment, 'Worker incomes might
"Well fall sufficiently that firms 'Would "Withdra"W employment in the face of
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falling sales. In such circumstances, the economy was, as it were, locked
into a low-level circuit of wage payments and consumption expenditures
that still left a portion of the workforce unemployed. An additional source
of demand was consequently needed if full employment were to be
achieved; and among the questions that preoccupied Keynes during the
time he was working through the drafts of The General Theory in the 1930s
were: why investment expenditure could not be counted on to provide the
additional demand a full employment economy required, and how this
investment insufficiency related to the character of investment as a form
of conventional activity. In important respects, then, Keynes's understanding of unemployment equilibria depended upon his thinking about conventions. Accordingly, we need to be able to explain how conventions
functioned, and how they determined levels of activity among individuals
making investment decisions, to be able to explain unemployment equilibria
for Keynes. This in turn suggests that, because conventional behaviour is
by nature an interactive sort of activity, we need to begin by looking at how
Keynes understood behaviour generally.
Before turning to what Keynes had to say in The General Theory about the
behaviour of economic agents in a general sense, it will be helpful to review
briefly his well-known exchange with Ramsey over Keynes's understanding
of intuition in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability. At issue is Keynes's theory of
judgement, an important cOll1ponent of a theory of decision-making and
action, and a topic which received serious attention in the Treatise on
Probabiliry. In his early philosophy Keynes had applied the theory of intuition, developed first by Moore and then by Bertrand Russell at the
beginning of the century, to the analysis of probability judgements. In
Keynes's view he believed hill1self to be extending Moore's and Russell's
philosophical revolution against the philosophical idealisll1 of EH. Bradley,
Bernard Bosanquet and J.E.M. McTaggart. But Keynes's view was also
original in departing from the then widely accepted frequency theory of
probability, which ll1ade probability judgements out to be empirical statell1ents about the relative frequencies of events. Keynes argued first in his
early unpublished Apostle paper, ·On Ethics in Relation to Conduct' (1904)
and later in the Treatise on Probability that the frequency theory presupposed
general rules whose application itself presupposed acts of judgement. This
seemed to give a special place to direct, unmediated intuitive judgetnent, or
intuition, and Keynes went on to conclude that probability judgements were
ultimately founded upon our intuiting abstract but real probability relations.
Ramsey, however, was altogether sceptical of both the idea of intuiting
metaphysical relationships and of the notion that individuals possessed a
capacity for insight into the nature of the reaL He concluded that
a fundamental criticisll1 of Keynes's views, is the obvious one that there
really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he
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describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be
perceived; but speaking for rnyself I feel confident that this is not true.
I do not perceive thern, and . . . m.oreover I shreVTdly suspect that
others do not perceive thern either . . .
(Ram.sey 1978: 63)
When Keynes finally carne to reply after Rarnsey's death, he sim.ply agreed:
'I think he is right' (C W. X: 338-9).4 This does not im.ply, it should be
ernphasized, that Keynes overthreVT the VThole of his early reasoning in the
Treatise on Probability about the forrns assurned by probability judgernents.
As argued by Jochen Runde (1994b, 1994c), Keynes alrnost certainly
retained his general cornparative probability conception that emphasized
ordinal comparisons, VThile discarding the Platonic relations metaphysics
rneant to explain the meaning of probability, VThich Ramsey had found an
easy target.
The significance of this for Keynes's later economics and thinking about
convention is that abandonrnent of a role for intuition in the Platonic sense
changed the conceptual foundations of Keynes's philosophical thinking
about decision-making and action. Since the judgernent involved in agent
decision-making could not be explained in terrns of an unrnediated intuitive
apprehension of timeless qualities and relations, it necessarily possessed a
historical character. Judgernent exercised by individuals in economic life
reflected their being historical individuals reasoning in terms of concrete
circumstances created by past patterns of events. Practically speaking, this
rneant that VTe looked to individuals' dispositions, tendencies and propensities to explain their behaviour. The social econornic VTorld exhibited a
variety of forces and causes operating upon individuals, and VTe could at
best sort out individuals' tendencies to respond to these forces and causes.
Keynes ""as clear about this in his summary of his rnodel, in Chapter 18 of
the Genera! Theory, <The General Theory of Ernployment Re-stated'. We
begin, he asserts, by identifying the factors that are given, the independent
variables, and the dependent variables, ""here chief among the 'ultimate
independent variables' are <the three fundarnental psychological factors,
narnely, the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude
to liquidity and the psychological expectation of future yield from capital
assets' (C W. VII: 246-7). These variables of course reflect levels or states
of activity associated -v.rith demand in different spheres of the economy.
Thus to understand aggregate dernand ""e needed to understand the dispositional character of human behaviour as a set of tendencies to respond
to the cornplex historical forces impinging upon individuals.
In The General Theory, then, Keynes turned a""ay from the more episodic
conception of judgernent and behaviour that he had adhered to in his early
philosophical intuitionism. In its place, he dre"" upon another tradition in
philosophy at Cambridge that regarded econornics as a rnoral science.
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Writing to Roy Harrod in 1938 in a letter critical of Lionel Robbins's natural
science conception of economics, Keynes stressed the need to understand
the complex character of human motivation to explain the distinctively
social behaviour studied in economics:
I . . . want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a
moral science. I mentioned before that it deals "With introspection and
"With values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations,
psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against
treating the material as constant and homogeneous.

(C W. XIV: 300)
Contrary to Robbins's view that a few simple principles were involved in
economic behaviour, decision-rnaking in economic life was a complex affair
with many factors entering into individual judgement. The deterrninacy
natural science seeks in its conclusions is unavailable in economics, which
as a moral science cornbines analysis of human motivation with an account
of the historical circumstances in "Which individuals find themselves. Thus,
there is no simple account of human judgernent available to us, as Keynes
had once thought possible in regarding judgement as intuition. Historical
individuals' intuitions, in fact, "Were 'intuitive' in the ordinary sense of the
term: rather unpredictable responses to cornplex circurnstances resulting
from a variety of competing rnotives.
From this perspective, we can see why Keynes dre"W back frorn his early
confidence in the powers of individual judgement, and charged hirnself and
his early friends at the 1938 Mernoir Club rneeting "With rnistakenly thinking
they could 'judge every individual case on its merits, and ["With] the "Wisdorn,
experience and self-control to do so successfully' (C W. X: 446). That view,
Keynes confessed, had been based upon 'an a priori view of "What hurnan
nature is like, both other people's and our own, which was disastrously
mistaken', when the conclusion which experience taught was that the
'hurnan race' did not sirnply consist of 'reliable, rational, decent people,
influenced by truth and objective standards, "Who can safely be released
from the outward restraints of convention and traditional standards and
inflexible rules of conduct' (C W. X: 447). Indeed, it was best to assurne,
Keynes emphasized, that 'civilization "Was a thin precarious crust erected by
the personality and will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and
conventions skilfully put across and guilefully preserved' (ibid.). Rules and
conventions, that is, anchored individual behaviour, whether in ethics,
politics or economic life, and we thus only grasped the behaviour of
individuals fully "When "We understood how it carne to be subsumed under
society's rules and conventions.
Econornic behaviour, in this respect, "Was thus in important ways interactive. Keynes had indicated as much in his letter to Harrod when he had
emphasized that economics rnade use of introspection and judgements of
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value. That is, just as economists might analyse the behaviour of individuals using introspection and judgements of value, so individuals in the
economic 'world also used these methods to evaluate each other's responses
to complex conditions that faced alL Since, contra Robbins, economic
behaviour "Was neither constant nor homogeneous, individuals typically
lacked clear strategies of response to the circumstances in which they
found themselves. One -way of addressing this -would be to examine the
behaviour of other individuals in like circumstances. By observing another's
actions and through introspection and judgements of value imputing a
motive to that individual for those actions, we could reinforce or revise
our o-wn opinions regarding desirable courses of action in similar circumstances. I have argued at length else-where (Davis 1994a) that this form of
interaction implies a conception of individual judgement that is best termed
interdependent judgement, and that, as a historical, concrete mode of
judgement replacing Keynes's earlier vie-w of judgement as abstract intuition, it operates in Keynes's various analyses of convention. Perhaps the
most vivid example of this is Keynes's metaphorical representation of
professional investment as a ne-wspaper beauty contest.
Recall that the question Keynes raised regarding placements -was: 'Ho-w
are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing
investments carried out in practice?' (C W. VII: 151). Keynes's ans-wer,
that this process of revaluation depends upon a convention that <the
existing state of affairs -will continue indefinitely, except in so far as -we
have specific reasons to expect a change' (ibid.: 152), only invites us to
-wonder -when there are indeed reasons to expect a change; or, as Keynes
puts it, ho-w precarious the convention regarding any given set of investments might be. Not very reassuringly, Keynes goes on to assert that a
'conventional valuation . . . is established as the outcome of the mass
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals' (ibid.: 154), or:
professional investment may be likened to those ne-wspaper competitions in -which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being a-warded to the competitor -whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences
of the competitors as a -whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not
those faces -which he himself finds prettiest, but those -which he thinks
likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of -whom are
looking at the problem from the same point of vie-w.
(c. W. VII: 156)
The idea that it is not the prettiest but those most likely to be thought the
prettiest nicely captures the change in Keynes's vie-w of judgement. No
longer does the individual intuit the real quality of beauty, but rather
proceeds to dra-w a judgement interdependently about -what others facing
the same dilemma may choose. Each contestant, in effect, uses introspection
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to consider his or her own opinion, compares that to an opinion imputed to
others, ITlakes adjustments for judgements of value, and COITles up with an
individual judgeITlent bearing the strong imprint of social opinion. PlaceITlent, which at any time involves considerable speculation, is in Keynes's
view little different. Individual investors cannot know through intuition the
true value of an investment, and thus rely upon their abilities to gauge the
mass psychology of the public and especially the temper of other investors.
The convention governing investment, therefore, may be defined as a
temporarily settled state of opinion that derives from a ITlass of interdependent judgements made by different individuals. 5
This, of course, does not tell us ITluch more about the precariousness of
the convention governing investment. Indeed, if anything, I<eynes's characterization of convention only raises ITlore questions about the dividing
line between the stability and instability of investment expenditure, since
the business of imputing motives to others (though we regularly do it) is
clearly fraught with considerable difficulty. Here, however, we begin to see
the state of development and status of Keynes's philosophical thinking
about the concept of convention. What Keynes was clear about on the
concept was that a convention is a structure of interdependent judgements
across individuals that both contributes to the determination of different
individuals' respective judgements and results from the interaction of
different individuals making their respective judgements. In the other
locations in The General Theory v.rhere the concept has a role, this viev.r
can well be seen at work. Admittedly, in no instance is as much attention
given to the notion as in Chapter 12 on long-term expectations, though
there are interesting things said, some explicit and some more implicit,
about bonds and the rate of interest (C.IP. VII: 202-4), about relative
money-v.rages and v.rage bargaining (ibid.: 264 ff.), about producer price
expectations (ibid.: 46-51), and about what Keynes calls the subjective
factors influencing consumption (ibid.: 107-12).
Unfortunately, in the secondary literature on the interpretation of Keynes
there is some confusion about what the concept of convention concerns.
Some writers have been quick to link conventional behaviour and irrational
behaviour, often thinking in the latter instance of Keynes's reference to
<animal spirits' (C.W VII: 161). George Shackle (1967, 1974) did much to
encourage this son"letimes popular viev.r, which has n"lore recently been
defended by Ted Winslow (1986) in connection with Keynes's interest in
Freud. Three points are in order. First, while for Keynes conventional
behaviour sOlnetill"les sin"lply involves individuals unrcflectivcly observing
conventions as rules of thumb, it ITlore often involves their operating within
patterns of activity that contribute to the structuring of their behaviour.
Second, Keynes clearly believes ll"luch decision-making is what is generally
terll"led rational (e.g. in connection with his chapter on the ll"larginal efficiency of capital). Third, Keynes also treats the existence of irrational
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behaviour separately from his treatment of conventional behaviour in both
<My Early Beliefs', v.rhere conventions actually control irrational impulses,
and in Chapter 12 of The General Theory, v.rhere conventional behaviour is a
(second-)best response to the dilemma of determining a good investment
in an uncertain v.rorld. This latter point has been emphasized by a number
of recent contributors to the topic of Keynes and convention. Anna
Carabelli (1988: 224) argues that conventional behaviour for Keynes
involves <practical techniques . . . for facing the future in a situation of
limited knowledge'. R.M. O'Donnell (1989: 251) sees investment conventions as a form of weak rationality. Tony Lav.rson (1985b, 1993) treats
conventional behaviour as a rational strategy, and adds that conventions
are an important form of social knowledge. Of course, much turns in this
on the meaning of 'rational'. If <rational' is taken in the Platonistic sense of
intuiting essential relations and qualities (as in O'Donnell), the term seems
mistaken and inappropriate. But if <rational' is equated with reasonable
judgement in the sense of being a cognitive process of deliberation set in
a historical context and influenced by individual values and motives (as in
Carabelli and Lawson), then it seems that conventional behaviour can v.rell
be thought 'rational'.
The position here is that because conventional behaviour is an interactive
activity, it needs to be understood on its own terms, apart from the issue of
v.rhether behaviour is rational or irrational. Some authors have emphasized
views of this sort. Oliver Favereau (1988) makes interactive behaviour and
conventions central to his interpretation of Keynes's probability thinking in
tenns of possible-v.rorlds reasoning. Similarly, Bruce Littleboy (1990: 29)
argues that <one of Keynes's most important innovations lay in the realization of the significance of conventions that arise v.rhen transactors, confronted by an uncertain environment, are psychologically disposed to act in
a manner in which they study and imitate the actions of others' .6 A. Orlean
(1989) advances a formal analysis of imitative interaction between professional speculators to account for a number of ideas in Keynes's Chapter 12
discussion of professional investors. Of course, imitative interaction is only
one (relatively simple) form of conventional behaviour, and to argue that
individual decisions tend to converge in an imitative process requires strong
assumptions about the patterns of interaction between individuals that
Keynes did not alv.rays make himself. Indeed, though Keynes was much
concerned with conventions as a basis for explaining behaviour in ways that
went beyond simple aggregation of individual behaviours, he did not go
very far in The General Theory tov.rards explaining the various different v.rays
in v.rhich conventions operated and changed.
What, then, v.ras Keynes not clear about in The General Theory in his
treatment of convention? Aside from not developing the distinctions
between different kinds of conventions, Keynes does not tell us much
about the stability or instability of conventions, whether those that govern
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investrnent or other domains of the economy, and thus his account of the
dynamics of conventions rernains to be developed. We do find in connection "With his discussion of investrnent in Chapter 12 a treatrnent of the
issue of investor confidence, a rnatter Keynes had puzzled over from the
time of his writing A Treatise on Monry. Thus it seerns fair to suggest that
"Were Keynes to have produced a second edition of The General Theory he
"Would have at least atternpted to say rnore about ho"W confidence affects
the stability or instability of the convention governing investment. This
extension might in turn serve as a rnodel for how the dynarnics of other
conventions operating in money markets, labour markets and else"Where
rnight begin to be explained. With this conclusion, "We thus turn to changes
Keynes rnight have pursued in a <second edition' of The General Theory.

CONVENTION IN A ~SECOND EDITION~ OF THE
GENERAL THEORY
To see how Keynes might have re-tailored his exposition in his twelfth
chapter on long-terrn expectations to allo"W more illurnination to fall on the
topic of confidence, it is necessary to look more closely at how he understood the convention governing investment as a structure of interdependent judgernents. For Keynes, conventions helped to deterrnine the levels
or states of activity taken on by the psychological propensities and attitudes
at work in the econorny. But strictly speaking, since these psychological
propensities and attitudes rnanifest thernselves in varying degrees in different individuals, it is more accurate to say that conventions act to
structure different individuals' propensities and attitudes in relation to
one another. This becomes clearer if "We think of a convention as a structure
of interdependent expectations (expectation being a forrn of judgement),
and note Keynes's special emphasis upon average expectation in his treatment of the convention governing investrnent. What constitutes a good or
bad investment, Keynes tells us, is <governed by the average expectation of
those "Who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed by the price of shares'
(Co W. VII: 151), where average expectation, from the perspective of the
beauty contest metaphor, is deterrnined according to <"What average opinion
expects average opinion to be' (ibid.: 156).
An average expectation of an investment's "Worth, ho"Wever, rnust subsume a set of different individual expectations, since different individuals
have different views regarding a given investment's "Worth. Different individuals rnight thus be said for Keynes to position thernselves in investrnent
markets relative to average opinions in those rnarkets. In doing so, they
compare average expectation and their o"Wn individual expectations regarding various investments, considering the "Weight they feel they should
ascribe to overall market opinion as embodied in average expectation
relative to the weight they feel they "Want to ascribe to their o"Wn individual
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opllllons and expectations. Each dimension of expectation has its o'-Vn
plausibility, and yet each also lacks certain advantages that the other
possesses. Average expectation reflects the judgement of many investors,
and thus carries a certain guarantee against individual errors in judgement.
Yet it is not a guide to making gains in the market since that requires
anticipating the movement or the market ('to out'-Vit the cro'-Vd'; C. W. VII:
155). Individual expectations, in contrast, often reflect special knoW'ledge or
opinion relevant to a given investment Cby reason partly of differences in
environment and . . . partly of differences in knoW'ledge and interpretation
of the situation'; ibid.: 198-9), and thus at least hope of gain. But, of
course, trying to beat the market also carries the possibility of loss. Investors, Keynes noted, are alW'ays intent on 'foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public' (ibid.:
154). Thus individual and average expectation both figure in investor
behaviour, and '-Ve may suppose that central to the stability of an investment market and the convention governing it is '-Vhatever balance is
achieved bet'-Veen individual and average expectation, W'here average expectation is continually likely to be changed by individual profit-seeking?
Keynes approached this question of balance or precariousness in terms of
the concept of confidence. There are three cases to distinguish to understand the role he gave to confidence. First. apart from the question of the
dynamics or movement in a given investment market, a conventional valuation might be stable if fluctuations in price around an average value tended
to leave price '-Vithin a certain range. In this instance, confidence W'ould tend
to manifest itself in a conviction on the part of individual investors that
average expectation W'as likely to prevail and individual vie'-Vs about an
investment's value added little to average opinion. Second, in investment
markets W'here price moved significantly but then fluctuated around a neW'
average value, confidence '-Vould manifest itself differently during the price
movement and aftel"W'ard: initially confidence '-Vould appear as a conviction
on the part of investors that some individuals ('-Vith one vie'-V of the
investment's price movement) had expectations superior to average opinion
(causing average expectation to continually shift); later, '-Vhen price carne to
fluctuate in a given range, confidence W'ould appear as a conviction that
average opinion '-Vas again a better guide to price. The third case is the one
that often concerned Keynes most, namely, that situation '-Vhere instability
seemed to rule in a given market valuation, and '-Vhere the market seemed
likely to move '-Vithout a clear destination. In this case, confidence is generally undermined, and fails even to be manifest in investor conviction that
an orderly movement in the market driven by superior individual expectations is afoot. Of course, Keynes kneW' that markets cannot be driven by
'bear' or 'bull' expectations indefinitely. But he W'as unable to say W'hy a
market '-Vould ultimately re-settle into some ne'-V range of values, or '-Vhy
confidence re-emerged after a period of turmoil in opinion.
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What W"e can thus say about Keynes's thinking about confidence is that it
turned on a balance betW"een individual and average expectation. What does
this imply? From a psychological perspective, confidence is an affective
state of mind in W"hich an individual brings closure to a cognitive process of
investigation by regarding any conclusions reached as adequate and satisfactorily final. Lack of confidence is reflected in indecision regarding the
boundaries appropriate to a thought process, and an inability to complete a
course of judgement. It W"ould not be reasonable, it seems, to expect
Keynes to have developed a psychological analysis of individual reasoning,
so as to be able to say hoW" individuals actually became confident about one
thing or another. What, hoW"ever, it seems it W"as appropriate for Keynes to
have done in his attention to confidence in The General Theory W"as to set out
an account of the conditions associated W"ith states of confidence obtaining
across individuals in various markets. That is, W"hat W"ere the circumstances
that in his vieW" alloW"ed confidence to emerge? In this respect, he W"ould
have built on his account of conventions as a form of interactive activity
W"here an interdependence of individual judgements explained levels of
activity of his independent variables. This, at the same time, W"ould probably
have gone beyond the modest sorts of changes a 'second edition' of The
General Theory W"ould have permitted.
In a 'second edition' of The General Theory, then, Keynes might have
proceeded by draW"ing more attention to the role of confidence in determining particular patterns of conventional judgement. To the extent that
this can be understood as a question of individual confidence, Keynes did
indeed emphasize the fragility of individual expectation in his reference to
conventional judgement in a subsequent paper. In his response to his critics
in his 1937 QuarterlY Journal if Economics paper he dreW" attention to this
theme:
KnoW"ing that our oW"n individual judgment is W"orthless, W"e endeavour
to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the W"orld W"hich is perhaps
better informed. That is, W"e endeavour to conform W"ith the behaviour
of the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals each of W"hom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to W"hat
W"e may strictly term a conventional judgment.
(C W. XIV: 114)
Moreover, as many commentators have noted, Keynes also took this
occasion to emphasize the radical uncertainty associated W"ith decisions
facing the future, a circumstance that could be expected to heighten the
sense of indecision and the fragility of the state of confidence in an
investment community. But if these points W"ere made more strongly in a
re-issue of The General Theory they W"ould not have taken the reader much
further toW"ards an understanding of W"hat might settle states of confidence.
And, since Keynes advanced an equilibrium theory of unemployment, he
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needed this further elelllent in his analysis, if conventions v.rere to be seen
as central to the explanation of the econollly. Thus ""e turn in the follo""ing
section to ho"" Keynes's argulllent lllight have been further developed
beyond the frallle""ork of The General Theory.

BEYOND THE GENERAL THEORY
That Keynes's basic understanding of a convention depends upon vie""ing
individual judgelllent as interdependent, v.rhere the illlputing of lllotives to
others involves conjecture and speculation, suggests that confidence is
central to the very process of judgelllent itself. Indeed, ""hen individuals
introspectively exallline their o""n lllotives and cOlllpare thelll to those they
think are justifiably illlputed to others, unless they possess SOllle llleasure of
confidence about their thinking, they seelll as likely to doubt their conclusions as think thelll reasonable. Every individual of course is a relatively
autonolllOUS being in the sense of possessing a private thought process. Yet
v.re custolllarily do lllake confident claillls about v.rhat ""e suppose others to
feel and think. Ho"", then, can individuals be confident that they correctly
illlpute lllotives and beliefs to others v.rhose thoughts and feelings are, as it
v.rere, hidden frolll vie",,? Traditionally there are nvo general ansv.rers to this
question, one of v.rhich figures prolllinently in Keynes's thinking. First,
through po""ers of inference ""e read individuals' lllotives frolll their
observed actions and behaviour. Confidence in illlputing lllotives to others
in this instance depends upon making reference to v.ridely accepted patterns
of connection benveen action and lllotive. Second, ""e also consult ""ith one
another, and then adjust our opinions accordingly. Keynes v.rould have cited
both of these explanations, but had special grounds for noting the latter. In
his characterization of the pursuit of average opinion in connection v.rith the
beauty contest llletaphor, he elllphasized the illlplicit, successive iterations
involved in individuals trying to anticipate ho"" others lllight anticipate
(ho"" others tnight anticipate, etc.) ""hat average opinion v.rould be:
It is not a case of choosing those v.rhich, to the best of one's judgtnent,
are really the prettiest, or even those v.rhich average opinion genuinely
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree ""here ""e devote
our intelligences to anticipating ""hat average opinion expects the
average opinion to be. And there are SOllle, I believe, v.rho practise
the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.
(c: W. VII: 156)
Yet hov.r lllany iterations such a process lllight involve is less the point here
than noting v.rhat is involved in the very possibility of there being higher
iterations. That is, to the extent that an individual is able to illlagine higher
degrees of anticipation, then that individual is able to illlplicitly confirlll
lo""er degrees of anticipation in others. 8 Confidence elllerges, consequently,
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if not quite by consultation, then by an interaction between individuals
commonly involved in attempting to establish each other's motives on a
common subject, where that interaction leads to successive degrees of
anticipation. On Keynes's view, therefore, because individuals engage in
interdependent judgement of often considerable complexity, they are able
to establish some confidence about one another's motives.
But to fully understand interdependence between individuals, it needs to
be remembered and emphasized that the process of imputing rnotives to
others is a many-sided one engaged in by many different individuals sirnultaneously. When Keynes speaks about the practices of the Stock Exchange,
he is not thinking only of his own case as one investor, but rather of rnany
like individuals interacting with one another on roughly the same basis. Thus
the iterative process of anticipating others' views is being carried out by
rnany individuals whose respective success in imagining higher iterations of
anticipation not only confirrns each individual's separate opinions about
others, but also tends to confirrn the entire collection of individuals in their
conjectures about investor rnotives in the market. Put sirnply, confidence
for Keynes is shared confidence. In effect, because judgernent is interdependent in the manner described, confidence emerges between individuals.
This means that if we are to extend Keynes's thinking about conventions in
The General Theory we tnust delineate the different conditions under which
shared confidence develops. For Keynes, the issue truly concerns states of
confidence obtaining between groups of individuals.
Recall, then, that our discussion of the precariousness or stability of
investtnent - the topic where the state of confidence is at issue for Keynes
- distinguished three cases according to the way in which confidence
develops or declines. In the first case, the market was relatively settled
and average expectation was dotninant. Here shared confidence coalesces
in a widespread conviction that individual expectations are quite sirnilar,
and that individual motives vary little. In the second case, where price
changes but then re-settles into a new range, there is initially a pattern of reevaluation of investor rnotives carried out by each individual in the tnarket,
at least until the direction of price change and likely full tnovetnent
becornes clear. Confidence in this case is shared at bes t by srnalier collections of investors who agree on the nature of the change in the rnarket
(such as <bulls' or 'bears'). Individual expectations are, however, obscure
across groups, and individuals lack confidence about their own opinions
rnore generally. The third case involves an unstable rnarket that rnay
fluctuate wildly or appear to be tnoving in one direction without sign of
re-settling. It tnight be thought that such a situation exhibits high levels of
confidence if tnany individuals ultitnately agree on the direction of the
tnarket (as in a crash). But it could also be argued that what confidence
individuals possess about each other's views is not deep in the sense of
involving higher degrees of anticipation, and that little confidence really
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exists ben.veen groups or individuals regarding v.,here the market is ultimately headed. Individual expectations. then. are not especially coherent.
confidence is fragile. and the convention that things -...vill remain the same
indefinitely is. as Keynes "\.Varned. precarious.
For Keynes. then. the conditions associated "\.Vith states of confidence
concern the success or lack of success -...vith "\.Vhich individuals corne to
assess each other's opinions about markets. Ho"\.Vever. given the complexity
of a process of interdependent judgement. "\.Vhere the subjects involved and
associated motives may be diverse and vary continuously over short periods
of time. explaining the conditions underlying different states of confidence
may be quite difficult. It "\.Vould certainly be a mistake to suppose, then, that
Keynes hoped or thought individuals' different judgements in any market
-...vould ultimately converge. or that the distribution of individual expectations about an average "\.Vould in the long run be small. <Bulls' and <bears' or
other...vise constituted divisions in opinions "\.Vere desirable and inescapable
dimensions of an economy built upon individual decision-making and
action. Keynes. none the less. "\.Vould still have liked to see less instability
in placement markets, since this seemed to depress investment expenditure
and consequently levels of aggregate demand. Thus as a long-term policy
proposal. Keynes recommended a some"\.Vhat comprehensive socialisation
of investment' (C W. VII: 378). "\.Vhereby public and semi-public boards and
agencies such as universities, port authorities. redevelopment corporations.
and so on. "\.Vould direct a larger share of total investment expenditure. This
institutionalization of investment "\.Vould in his vie-...v create conditions for
better communication and understanding among individuals "\.Vithin organizations having shared purposes. and. on the grounds that like minds
"\.Vould conceivably exhibit higher states of confidence. lead to more stable
investment rates in part of the economy. The investment community at
large. Keynes believed. "\.Vas simply too atomistic to avoid the regular s"\.Vings
in confidence that lent the convention surrounding investment its periodic
instability. and accordingly a long-term policy sensitive to the conditions of
confidence "\.Vas in order.
The concept of shared confidence, then. "\.Vould have required ne-...v texts
and another venue subsequent to any re-issue of The General Theory to be
adequately developed. Much of "\.Vhat the notion involves "\.Vas implicit in
Keynes's treatment of convention as a structure of interdependent judgement, and much of "\.Vhat is involved in the idea of creating a stronger climate
of confidence -...vas explicit in Keynes's "\.Vritings for many years both before
and after The General Theory. Indeed. Keynes's o"\.Vn personal confidence that
there -...vere al"\.Vays steps that could be taken to reduce unemployment demonstrates the importance he placed on the idea that the conditions of confidence
"\.Vere central to the operation of the economy. Of course. Keynes may not
ever have chosen to direct his energies to"\.Vards this more social philosophical
aspect of his thinking. The direction of his intellectual development for many
C
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years had been away from. philosophical argum.ent, and it is difficult to
im.agine an individual so involved in practical affairs taking tim.e away from.
his m.any com.m.itm.ents to elaborate upon such concerns. It would have
required, no doubt, a very peaceful and extended retirem.ent.

KEYNES AND WITTGENSTEIN
It m.ay none the less be possible to speculate about Keynes's later philosophical thinking regarding convention by considering ideas he m.ay have
shared with Wittgenstein. It is well known that Keynes and Wittgenstein
knew each other at Cam.bridge, and it seem.s that they were also acquainted
with each other's work (Coates 1990). Indeed, their intellectual histories
followed certain com.m.on paths. Both m.ade significant contributions to the
early twentieth-century Cam.bridge philosophy initiated by Moore and
Russell - Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Keynes in
his A Treatise 0/ Probability - and both later abandoned m.any of their early
ideas in revolutions in thinking that fundam.entally influenced philosophy
and econom.ics respectively. Moreover, Wittgenstein joined Ram.sey in
criticizing Keynes's probability relation,9 and Keynes indicates that he
had opinions about Wittgenstein's later philosophy in correspondence.
What is there, then, in Wittgenstein's later thinking that has links to Keynes's
later philosophical thinking?
One im.portant dim.ension of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is its
abandonm.ent of the view held in the earlier Tractatus that language is ultim.ately com.posed of nam.es, the m.eanings ofwhich are sim.ple objects. In the
Investigations Wittgenstein substituted the view that the m.eaning of an expression is its use, as reflected, as he put it, in the language gam.e in which that
expression is used. Keynes had held a view sim.ilar to the m.eanings-as-nam.es
view in his own early work where he used Moore's notion of there being an
indefinable sim.ple quality of goodness that we know intuitively in accounting
for the m.eaning of the term. <good' (see Davis 1994a: ch. 1). And, like
Wittgenstein, he later cam.e to em.phasize (in <My Early Beliefs,) the im.portance of social rules and conventions such as would be involved in a language
gam.e in Wittgenstein's sense to account for what m.ight be thought to be
good. Each, then, reasoned that social practices, each having a relative
autonom.y, played an im.portant role in determ.ining the m.eanings of the
objects and activities of the world. For Wittgenstein this also m.eant that
one could not typically produce a rationale for the rules a language game or
practice exhibited. One rather grasped their function and purpose by, as it
were, playing the language game or participating in the practice. Much the
sam.e opinion enters into Keynes's discussion of convention in The General
Theory. The convention governing investm.ent m.ay be said to have rules in the
interaction am.ong individual investors, but these implicit rules only have
m.eaning within the framework of that conventional behaviour.
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It tnight be thought, however, that Wittgenstein's thinking about language games really concerns matters essentially little related to what preoccupied Keynes in his attention to convention in The General Theory.
Keynes wanted to account for patterns of interaction between individuals
in different domains of the economy, in order to explain aggregate demand
and unemployment equilibria. Wittgenstein was interested in re-explaining
language meaning as part of a more general project of redeveloping our
theory of mind and conception of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise.
Yet Keynes's conception of the operation of a convention actually shares
more of Wittgenstein's project about language games than it initially
appears. The determination of an investment's value in the form of a
community of investors' average expectation constitutes a meaning of sorts
for the activity of making that investITlent for individual investors.While
market values are not ITleanings in the ordinary sense of language meanings,
they none the less bear sense interpretable by individuals who are part of
the practice in which they are defined. Indeed, Wittgenstein's abandonment
of the idea that meanings are names itself encourages a new view of what
sorts of entities meanings are. The traditional view of meanings as linguistic
items that bear relations to various features of the world is replaced by the
view that meaning is a product of a social practice. Thus, on this broader
view, an investment value is a ITleaning not in the sense of a number that
simply compares a flow of possible earnings and capital goods purchase
costs, but rather in the sense that those earnings and costs reflect a social
practice eITlbedded in certain historical opportunities, investor sentiITlents
and patterns of market development.
FrOITl this perspective, Keynes's view that average expectation emerges
from the play of individual expectation, where an inherited or reigning
average value represents a point of departure for individual investors, can
be seen to bear interesting connections to Wittgenstein's concept of <family
resemblance'. Wittgenstein's idea was that in every case where things are
called by the same name there is not a single quality or set of qualities
common to all these things, but rather 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes over-all siITlilarities, sometimes siITlilarities in detail' that he terITled <family resemblances'
(Wittgenstein 1953: 32e). On this view, a name does not represent quite
the same thing to all individuals, though generally individuals who understand a name somewhat differently can appreciate each other's usages
through participating in language games where the naITle is employed.
Keynes's treatment of a convention involves essentially the saITle understanding. Individual expectations regarding investments are typically distinguished from average expectations, the analogue of a comITlon name.
Yet individual investors, though they may doubt one another's investment strategies, can still appreciate that each is, as it were, playing the
same game. Thus just as the meaning of naITles is established for

219

J.B.

DAVIS

Wittgenstcin in a practice that distributes features of that tneaning across a
variety of gatnes or usages, none of which possess all those features, so for
Keynes the tneaning of an investtnent is distributed across a variety of
individual expectations each of which reflects sotne insight into an investtnent's worth, but none of which fully captures that range of insights.
One further cotnparison between Keynes and Wittgenstein seetns in
order. Wittgenstein is well known for his argutnent that there cannot be
a private language in the sense of a set of tneanings that individuals tnight
allocate apart frotn interaction with others through acquaintance with inner
streall1S of consciousness. More broadly, Wittgenstein believed that descriptions of our tnental acts and states of mind were governed by criteria that
made reference to the circull1stances, behaviour and dispositions of individuals. Keynes, we saw above, approached individuals' behaviour dispositionally, and then in his 1l10ral science rell1arks ll1ade this a ll1atter of
individuals' <ll1otives, expectations, and psychological uncertainties' (C W.
XIV: 300). But it is ill1portant here to understand Keynes's view of the
linkage between psychology and behaviour. When individuals consider the
motivations of others in order to understand their actions, they introspectively establish what motives they themselves would have were they to
pursue similar actions, because they wish to have SOll1e basis for explaining
other individuals' observed behaviour in terll1S of possible motives. Thus if
an individual were to satisfy him or herself that another individual had
some motive where a certain action was observed, an understanding of the
circull1stances, behaviour and dispositions of individuals - observable
behaviour generally - would be the key to cOll1paring individuals' unobservable motives. Keynes, then, seems to share a conception of psychology
and behaviour similar to the one Wittgenstein employed. Indeed, since
Keynes had held in his A Treatise on Probability that one could be directly
acquainted with one's inner sensations (all1ong other things), but gave up
this view with his abandonll1ent of intuition as a source of direct insight
into the world, it seems that a case could also be ll1ade for saying that
Keynes would have agreed with Wittgenstein that private languages were
not possible.
Of course, the points outlined here about the philosophical connections
between Keynes and Wittgenstein are speculative, and would require more
careful discussion to ll1ake either a case for their having shared views or the
particular interpretation suggested here of Keynes's later ideas (cf. Davis
1996). But it is not unreasonable to attell1pt such an argument, since not
only were Keynes and Wittgenstein aware of the way each other's work had
developed from a nUll1ber of COITlmon beginnings, but both shared a
cliITlate of intellectual development at Cambridge in the 1930s that must
have reinforced ITlany of the views they each developed separately. Certainly this latter developtnent, that of the intellectual climate in which they
operated, is sometitnes neglected in intellectual histories which chart each
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individuars path in isolation frofn the larger sodal and intellectual world
and the connections between the different disdpHnes. Further thinking
about Keynes's later philosophy, which received little elaboration by Keynes
in hjs later years) 'would seem to require greater attention to this wider

sphere of intellectual development.
NOTES
1 Keynes added that this 'was hardly a state of mind which a g(own~up person in
his senses could sustain lit.erally' (p. 422). All references to Keynes's works are by
volume number to the Collected Writings 0/John Mqynard Kryne.r.
2 One good measure of the difficulty of interpreting Keynes's argument is the
difficulty of detennining the standing of IS-I~{ analysis in Keynes's thinking.
See Young (1987) for a valuable account of the early problems of interpreting
The GClJcral Theory.
3 That Keynes did not assume rigid money-wages is clearly apparent in Chapters 2
and 19 of The General Theory.
4 See Cottrell (1993) for a good discllssion of this impottant exchange.
S For an influential, recent philosophical account of convention emphasizing
interdependent judgement that is very close to the analysis here, see Lewis
(1969). For a discussion about the proper concept of convention to attribute to
Keynes, see Runde (1994c).
6 Littleboy goes on to advance for Keynes a theory of macroeconomic dynaIllics
based on the interaction of different conventions in different spheres of the
economy (Little boy 1990: 289f£').
7 Keynes'S discussion of 'bears' and <bulls' in money markets is particularly
appropriate: <[t]he market price [that is, average e.xpectation in the language of
Chapter 12] 'Will be fixed at the point at which the sales of the «bears" and the
purchases of the "buUs" are balanced' (C U-:::: VII: 170).
8 Lev.ris (1969) is especiaUy clear on the iterative nature of anticipation in a
convention.
9 In his 1935 Lent 'Term Lectures, \XTittgenstein was tecorded by Alice Ambrose
as saying:: 'Keynes claimed to discover a probability relation which was like
implication. But logic is a calculus. not a natural science, and in it one can make
inventions but not discoveries' (Ambrose 1979: 138-9). Wittgenstein later
credited Ram.sey and Sr.l.ffa, another. friend of Keynes, in the preface to his
Philosophical.lnvestigations with being the chief influences on the, dcvelopIllcnt of
the ide,as in that influential book.
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